Executive Summary
Succession, as we can see in the current and all previous examples, remains the Achilles heel of the Russian political system. Putin's "anointment" of Dmitri Medvedev suggests to many observers a regency or adoption, i.e. a medieval concept of the state. And indeed the contemporary Russian model resembles in many ways a feudal society and state and especially the Muscovite model postulated by many Western writers, including the author. Some analysts even see Russia even now as a failing state due to this structural regressiveness.
Succession, for which there is no established legal procedure, duly remains a source of this model's weakness. Every post-Soviet succession has been accompanied by force, electoral fraud on a grand scale, and a steady narrowing of democratic and public political participation. The most recent succession struggle is no different, featuring gross electoral manipulation, arrests and murders of high-ranking officials, etc. These coups, arrests, and murders are also accompanied by large-scale transfers of property to one or another faction, indicating again that the basis of Russian political affiliation remains the faction or "clan," not one of kinship but of political patronage and clientilism which is based, like medieval feudalism, on the principle of nul homme sans seigneur.
Such manifestations of infighting are to be expected in the Muscovite model based on the concept of the Tsar's patrimonial power over the economy, and the institution of the boyar service state where all must serve to acquire the rents that they seek from the state that grants them. Of course, in such a state there is no pretense about civil and human rights, nor are there even enforceable property rights.
Hence the elites' struggle for access, power, and property is constant and never-ending, and Tsars and presidents deliberately encourage the division of the elite into rival and competing factions. And each of these intra-elite struggles is a total struggle for the losers lose everything, a fact that explains their intensity. Moreover, an endless struggle for rent-seeking imperial expansion, though not necessarily territorial, is an indispensable function of the system because it is the only way new rents to accommodate new servitors can be found. Likewise, the inculcation of nativism and hostility to foreign powers is another constant of such a system. Indeed, the greatest threat to it is not American power but American ideals, i.e. democracy. Thus the anti-Western drift of Russian foreign policy is not merely a sign of campaigns to arouse public opinion on behalf of the government; rather it is the inherent logic of the system. Putin is manipulating the "power vertical" to ensure that he and his appointments hold on to power into the Medvedev period by upholding the threat of investigation and prosecution over all officials and politically interested personages. Similarly, new institutional checks on democratic and even elite competition have been instituted. Among them are groups like the youth group Nashi, which mobilizes public opinion, especially among the youth, on behalf of the regime and against its domestic and foreign critics; similarly media controls have been extended far beyond what they were.
Moreover, the Investigations Committee (SK) has been set up to concentrate the investigative and prosecutorial power in the Presidential Administration, not the regular state, making it a formidable weapon for a purge of the elite, not unlike Ivan the Terrible's Oprichnina, which could take lives and property with impunity. We may envision the SK as an institution that simultaneously abets and restrains this kind of politics, by creating a pervasive possibility of investigation and conviction among all elites.
As these institutions were being set up, secret police controls and penetration of key institutions were also extended and legislation allowing for the takeover of the country by the power structures -if necessary -was also enacted into law. Thanks to such moves, the mafia-like tendencies of the regime have become entrenched, and corruption and criminality have mushroomed with the growing fusion between organized crime and the government in many centers.
As the Politkovskaya and Litvinenko murders suggest, opponents of the regime are at risk of ever greater violence. Thus, while this regime appears stable, its foundations are decidedly shaky and its propensity towards Introduction Vladimir Putin's self-proclaimed mission was to strengthen the Russian state. But as he leaves the presidency, it is an open question if he has strengthened the state or merely a particular regime. Considerable evidence suggests that the Russian state still suffers from profound dysfunctionalities. 1 Indeed, Gordon Hahn's recent study of the Islamic terrorist threat to Russia in the North Caucasus flatly states that, "Despite Putin's efforts to recentralize power, Russia remains a weak state, is becoming a failing state, and risks becoming a failed one."
2 Neither is he the only analyst to so characterize Russia under Putin, although this remains a decidedly minority opinion.
3 Certainly Putin and other analysts thought the state in danger of failing as Putin took power, so there is consensus as to the initial diagnosis of the situation. 4 Arguably that weakness remains despite economic recovery. The core of the monarchic principle of transition from one leader to another is not so much a succession on a kinship basis, but the power of the current leader to appoint an heir and disregard the will of the people and many elites. This circumstance was of the greatest importance for contemporary Russia, where a sort of feudal monarchy emerged, with succession based not on kinship but on the choice of the current leader from a few candidates, a practice that was elaborated in the Roman Empire.
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The monarchic aspect of the current succession also underscores how Putin, like his Soviet and Tsarist predecessors, views the state, namely as his "votchina," i.e. patrimony that he can hand out like property to any designted successor. In this respect, too, Shalpentokh sees the feudal analogy between the royal domain, i.e. the king's private property which often feudal kings sought to expand into the state to erase distinctions between their property and the state as a whole. Bulbov's arrest led Viktor Cherkesov, his boss and head of Gosnarkokontrol and a long-standing friend and colleague of Putin (albeit bitter rival of the FSB's head Nikolai Patrushev) to go public in the media, warning that the security serrvices were in danger of becoming embroiled in "an all against all" war for power and influence that could destroy the state. In turn, Cherkesov's going public provoked Putin's ire because the article exposed the inner workings of the regime and was interpreted as a direct strike against the patron of the FSB in Putin's inner circle, his long-time aide Igor Sechin, the reputed head of the Siloviki faction. Indeed, Bulbov was reportedly bugging the offices of the FSB and Ministry of Interior (MVD) leadership.
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So when this scandal went public, the results were highly embarassing to all parties. Putin's announcement that he would head the United Russia party, create his own personal movement "for Putin" (za Putina), and retain the office of prime minister to head the future government may well be traceable, at least in part, to this scandal that showed that the Siloviki could not restrain their struggle for power and could tear the regime apart. also an ever greater contraction of the space available for democratic politics. Likewise, each succession is then followed by a new redivision of assets under state control as well as the enhancement of state controls over the economy. This redivision is already occurring as Gazprom, tied to the probable new president-to-be, Dmitry Medvedev, is already angling to take over Tomskneft, the prize subsidiary of Rosneft, the fief of his rival Igor Sechin. 15 Such moves underscore the fragility of the status quo and explain why, despite many Russian and foreign analysts' statements that Russia is back as a great power, Russia remains a risk factor in world affairs on account of its internal realities. 16 Similarly many observers question the durability of the Putin-Medvedev arrangement. Either they fear Medvedev is too weak to assume the real powers of the presidency and discipline the rival factions or that Putin will not let go of the powers he has accrued, especially as there are signs, discussed below, that he is already angling to increase the prime minister's powers at the expense of the president. 17 Thus the state's foundation becomes ever narrower as rival factions, "clans," and bureaucratic patronage networks fight for power. Moreover, absent any authoritative legal mechanism or accountability, ultimately the only way a Tsar can rule,-and this applies to Yeltsin, Putin, and their Tsarist and Soviet predecessors as well-is by constant "checks and balances" among the elite, i.e. a constant balancing act among rival factions. The Tsar checks and balances each group by the other while remaining in some sense above the fray, not least through the mystique of Tsardom and the popular cult of personality as Putin, pace Stalin, has done. Policy thus often emerges out of the strife of these bureaucratic and "courtly" factions.
The Muscovite Paradigm and the Service State
The machinations of the elites, not just the so called Siloviki-alumni of the power organs, most notably Andropov's KGB, the multiple armed forces, and the Russian FSB-but also the more "civilian" members of the elite and their The state in this paradigm was also, as was the Tsarist and Stalinist state, a service state in which everyone was bound to serve the state and power, while income, especially at the top of society, only came from the rewards of service.
Just as the "Boyars" must serve in order to gain control over the rents coming from the state and are thus a rent-seeking elite, so too the state grants them these rents on condition that they serve the Tsar well (even if corruptly). Hence the state is a rent-granting state. In less stringent times, e.g. after the emancipation of the serfs, the obligation to serve was partially relaxed, but it is clear in Putin's Russia that his topmost elites are state servants exactly as were Tsarist or Soviet officials. The old system of appointment and staff rotation has been reduplicated. Establishing an infrastructure of secret services the local police do not control, the federal center regained the previously lost leverage with the regions. Shifting representation in law enforcement agencies, the president ended up with a "security horizontal" at his service. Along with the executive verticals, it forms a kind of carcass holding the state together. To a certain extent, the authorities have reduplicated the Stalin system when control over regional elites was maintained through (and with encouragement of) a confrontation between party organizations and security structures. In conflicts like that, the federal center is always well-informed on everything. These days, we have a conflict between security structures and regional elites. State officials feel themselves under observation and abstain from what they were free to do only recently.
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In other words, we see multiple signs of regression to past Soviet and Tsarist practices. And the regularity of succession crises only reinforces that trend. It is not for nothing that Vladimir Furman has observed that "managed democracies are actually a soft variant of the Soviet system." 20 The resort to violence and to the "adoption model" not only reinforces Russia's paternalistic and patrimonial tradition, it also enhances the role of the special services and power structures (Silovye Struktury, whence the term Siloviki) who possess a monopoly over compromising information on the various elite players, the means of force, and proximity to the center of power.
Although all these groups profess a devotion to the national interest and certainly believe in the immaturity of Russian society and its vulnerability to ideological corruption or infection, (as did their Tsarist and Soviet forebears) their cohesion is limited by virtue of their constant rivalry for power, position, and wealth. While they may profess or even believe that they alone incarnate the genuine national state interest of Rusisa, in fact as the Bulbov case shows, the driving forces of much state action are much more prosaic and sordid. The drive for power, status, fortune, and position, as well as fear of losing it all are common attributes of these people, but they are a slippery foundation for effective state action.
At the same time, all the elites seek either to become president and/or bind the incoming president to the supposed norms of "collective authority" while the ruler, like Yeltsin in 1999 and Putin now, are determined to rule unfettered as autocrats. Finally, all these succession struggles render Russia a more obstructive and unpredictable partner in world politics due to its internal instability, since ideological mobilization against all enemiesdomestic and foreign-is needed to create a political bloc in society and to some degree outside of the bureaucracy for a candidate or for a president.
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Thus Vladimir Shlapentokh has shown that an essential component of the Kremlin's ideological campaign to maintain the Putin regime in power and extend it (albeit under new leadership) past the elections of 2008 is tantamount to anti-Americanism. As he wrote:
The core of the Kremlin's ideological strategy is to convince the public that any revolution in Russia will be sponsored by the United States. Zero-Sum Games and the Intensity of Political Infighting Not surprisingly, the greatest threat to this system is hardly terrorism, but rather democracy. And thus as Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov warned in 2006, the greatest threat to Russian security lay in efforts to transform the "constitution" of any of the CIS members. 23 Likewise, imperial or neoimperial expansion along with the mobilization of public hostility to "enemies" is the only basis on which rents can be found in a sub-optimal economy with which to bring in the proliferating number of elites and their retainers(Druzhina). Such tactics are a proven way of enhancing presidential popularity.
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Given the nature of inter-elite rivalries, their struggles are almost invariably zero-sum games. Those who lose, lose everything, and vice versa. Thus every succession struggle, even if they become progressively narrower in scope, remains as equally intense for its players. Thus Putin's government has long since emancipated itself from any control by or accountability to any kind of social, economic, or political "veto groups" or interest groups. Not surprisingly, every conceivable form of criminality and corruption also permeates the regime.
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Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that as the political system narrows, the sanctioned participation of the various army and police organizations in it, and recent successes in rent-seeking, i.e. higher budget and other appropriations, is growing. 27 As these "veto groups" have a vested pecuniary interest in hyping the so-called foreign threat to get more appropriations and These activities reflected, and still reflect, the ruling elite's awareness of its own illegitimacy and the fragile conditionality of its own tenure and access to power, perks, and property. This elite's panic about the succession therefore underscores the Russian state's essential weakness and illegitimacy. Domestic Struggle, Military Reform, and Extra-Legal Organizations Equally importantly, and at the same time, military reforms, for which reformers have fought since 1985, increasingly assumed the aspect of preparation for an intensified domestic struggle involving the use of force or the threat thereof. This point is especially pertinent to the ongoing modernization and transformation of the force structure of Russia's multiple militaries, particularly the ground forces and the Ministry of Interior's Internal Forces (Vnutrennye Voiska Ministerstvo Vuntrennykh Del' or VVMVD), and the Federal Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti or FSB).
These forces underwent and are still undergoing sustained overhaul and transformation in order to become more mobile, more able to project power rapidly throughout Russia's expanse, and more capable of meeting the threat posed by terrorist or other insurgents in the Caucasus and/or Central Asia. Thus those forces are being transformed in ways that could allow politicians in the future to complete the transformation of the forces into primarily domestic counter-insurgency forces along Latin American or more general Third World lines whereby domestic security is the Army's main function.
Since an armed coup, or the threat of the deployment of force, within the Russian Federation's boundaries as a way to influence the 2008 succession was an ever-present possibility, these transformations of force structure, though intended to meet genuine international threats like terrorism and insurgency, could have radically different, but no less profound consequences for Russia, its neighbors and interlocutors. In general, we can discern a trend towards the creation of new, often extra-legal organizations that seek to ensure ideological and political compliance and are backed up either by the resort to extra-legal and even paramilitary uses of force, or the overall extension of police power, including the potential use of one or more of the multiple militaries in a domestic role.
One example is the youth group Nashi. It has already launched riots and demonstrations against Polish, Estonian, and British diplomats for actions that displeased the Kremlin, including ambassadorial meetings with members of the opposition. Nashi has also been used to intimidate the regime's domestic opponents. It enjoys support from the Foreign Ministry, the government, and media for these attacks on diplomats and embassies. 31 Its members are financed opaquely but clearly from pro-Kremlin oligarchs and probably from the state. Its main function is to conduct ideological indoctrination of a cult of personality for Putin and of fanatical loyalty to his regime and hatred for its opponents, domestic and foreign. This includes systematic anti-Western indoctrination. 32 One of its founders, the Kremlin propagandist Sergei Markov, stated that, "we launched Nashi in towns close to Moscow so that activists could arrive overnight on Red Square, if needed. The idea was to create an ideology based on a total devotion to the president and his course." 33 Nashi, a cross between the old Komsomol and the Hitler Jugend, conducts paramilitary training of its members in preparation for challenging the opposition's street demonstrations and to carry out acts of intimidation against them, diplomats, and provincial Russian politicians functioning as a powerful political instrument. 34 
Control over and Intimidation of the Media
Coercive state monitoring has also extended to the media. This is the case entirely apart from the murder of reporters, most notably, but not only Anna Politkovskaya in 2006. 35 In January 2007, President Putin reminded the security services that:
It is important not only to ensure law and order, but also to protect society from attempts to push the ideology of extremism and national and confessional intolerance into the public-political field. … This work must be done strictly in line with the law and all of your steps must be based on the Constitution and Even before the most recent decrees and anti-media activities, the regime had gone out of its way to silence opposition media. The murders of journalists throughout the country, Anna Politkovskaya being only the most famous among them, has stimulated a climate of fear among journalists, some of whom have personally communicated this sentiment to the author of this paper. But violence is only one weapon in the state's arsenal.
The regime exercises (subtle) power to ensure media orthodoxy. A popular method is to change ownership and to install an owner who complies with the editorial guidelines desired: that is, one that does not criticize the political leadership. Other state methods include the control of (financial) resources, economic pressure, appeals to patriotism, and implicit threats. As an example of using pressure in this manner, Russian regulators in 2006 forced more than 60 radio stations to stop broadcasting news reports produced by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Officials threatened to cancel the renewal of the offending radio stations' broadcasting licenses -as a consequence, most of the Russian stations stopped broadcasting these news reports. 41 Neither are these actions the end of the potential use of the police power of the state to intimidate citizens, including members of the elite themselves. The regime has borrowed another page from medieval Muscovy and the USSR, which forced citizens to spy on their neighbors. 42 Specifically, the Federal Tax Service has issued an appeal to citizens to inform on their neighbors who rent apartments or homes without official contracts or who do not pay taxes. 43 The Federal Tax Service has also proposed expanding the range of sources that can or must submit information on the population's income to the tax authorities. This would include organizations that pay cash prizes to individuals, information on all sales of movable property, and the sales of means of transport. 44 Obviously the demand for information and informers will not stop here under the absence of rule of law and the development of a police state buttressed by ever-new mechanisms of repression and investigation.
Security Services and the Armed Forces
This penetration of society by police and other informers has long been the case in the armed forces. Restoring the FSB's Special Departments and ordering them to prevent activity "by individuals aimed at harming Russia's security," and all mutinies and plots against the established constitutional order, Putin, upon taking power, let the FSB recruit informers from within the army "on a confidential basis." 45 This was not an innovation, since in 1996-97 FSB members publicly bragged about their political surveillance of the officer corps. 46 Now, the FSB is responsible for preventing any activity aimed at harming Russia's security and monitoring all plans involving mutiny and efforts at a violent overthrow of the existing constitutional order, and has the right to recruit confidential agents. The FSB also now integrates all counter-intelligence units with its "unified, centralized Rossiyskaya Gazeta, in Russian, April 12 1995 , FBIS-SOV-95-076, April 20 1995 Segodnya, in Russian, February 16 1995 , FBIS-SOV-95-033, February 17 1995 ; Konstantin Preobrazhensky, "FSB-Army Relations a Well-Kept Secret", St Petersburg Times, December 16-20 1996.
system." 47 In addition, the FSB formally controls the border guards, the counting of votes in the election, and guarantee of general state security.
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But the demand for informers to report illicit income suggests a desire to extend this mechanism ever further throughout society, as was the case under Communism.
Recent military moves also suggest a deliberate effort to ensure military loyalty at the expense of any hope of demilitarizing Russian politics and putting the armed forces under truly democratic civilian control. First, Putin extended the tenure of chief of Staff General Yuri Baluyevsky for three years, even though he reached the mandatory retirement age in early 2007. This was widely interpreted as a reward for service and as a signal to the armed forces that no more "destabilizing" reforms would be undertaken in return for its loyalty to whomever Putin chooses.
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Likewise, the replacement of Sergei Ivanov, a leading candidate for Putin's succession, as defense minister by Anatoly Serdyukov and Ivanov's promotion to the post of deputy prime minister almost certainly were tied to Putin's efforts to manage the succession up to the last moment, and balance rival clans (since Serdyukov and his father-in law, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov, are part of Sechin's Siloviki faction).
This reshuffle also considerably undid Putin's promotion of the Ministry of Defense over the General Staff in 2004, by restoring the General Staff's primacy in defense planning in return for its loyalty. 50 Indeed, when making these moves, Putin announced that the General Staff would recover some of the responsibilities it lost in 2004.
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Serdyukov's tasks would mostly concentrate on auditing and controlling (in the Russian sense of kontrol') procurement spending and defense spending in general. 52 Of course, the price paid is a further militarization of Russian politics and regression away from genuine civilian and democratic control over the armed forces. 47 Chazan, "Putin Orders Security Agency …", p. A21. 48 Gallina, "Law and Order in Russia", p. 9. Pavel Felgenhauer, a leading defense analyst, saw this reshuffle as intending to weaken Ivanov's position among the military, enhance the General Staff's power and authority, and create two decision-making centers in the military so that there will not be a unified military organization upon which someone could rely on to challenge the process or results of the upcoming 2008 presidential election. Another approach suggests that both this reshuffle and the dramatic escalation of East-West tensions generated by Putin from his Munich Wehrkunde speech of February 2007 are intended to create a situation where Russia's political development depends on him alone and foreign influence is excluded.
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Other analysts regarded this reshuffle as an attempt to provide balance, and to add to further rivalry, between Ivanov and Medvedev, while at the same time bringing in a new and third deputy prime minister, Lev Naryshkin, to compete with and balance the former two figures. The promotion of Zubkov to the post of prime minister in September 2007 may have been part of the same process. Not surprisingly, Naryshkin soon figured prominently in considerable speculation, encouraged by Putin's aides, e.g. Igor Shuvalov, as a potential "dark horse" or "third candidate." 54 In the larger context, then, this reshuffle is also seen as Putin's way of maintaining his "checks and balances" to "rein in" any successor's power and opportunities. 55 The passing of a budget for three years to go through 2010 must be accounted as another effort to restrict any future ruler's room for discretionary economic and political maneuver.
Be that as it may, these moves also show that Putin is consciously retreating from his own administrative reforms of 2004, which were supposed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the government and its ministries, by reducing parallel power centers. Instead, he is again enlarging the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense, as well as the state machine, by creating new deputy prime ministers. Once again, law cannot restrain the appetites of individuals and short-term political considerations. Russia, as these moves indicate, is not even able to reach the level of "regular government," an ideal of Tsarist reformers in the 18 th and 19 th centuries, and is devolving again into a congeries of diverse and uncoordinated offices responsible only to the Tsar. As Lilia Shevtsova suggests, the bureaucracy is again consolidating itself, or being consolidated from above, because whoever succeeds Putin will inevitably have no choice but to consolidate his power by forcing Putin's team to step aside and bringing in his own team. Russian politics has been gripped by the issue of what comes after Putin, and the regime has tried in every way possible to ensure its control and ability to determine every step of the process leading to that succession lest it be overwhelmed or torn apart by its own fragility and internal rivalries.
The Icing on the Cake: the Investigations Committee Finally, one of the most sinister of such new innovations, and clearly a more important one in this context of elite rivalry in a succession, is the creation of a new committee that will take over investigations from the General Prosecutor's (Procurator) office, including investigations of candidates for the Duma or for the presidency. This "Investigations Committee" (Sledstvennyi Komitet or SK) was apparently the product of complex maneuverings within the elite. While its creation represented a victory for the Siloviki, Putin apparently picked his own man to head it, his former classmate at Leningrad State University, Aleksandr' Bastrykin. 58 The SK clearly emerged out of the ruling elite's internecine struggles and they view it as a weapon against rivals in both regular political environments and during a succession. The SK transfers the right to conduct investigations and prosecutions from the General Prosecutor's office to itself, and appears to many as the pilot project for a grand law-enforcement authority, not unlike the FBI in its heyday, that will unite and oversee all investigations. Thus whoever presides over it will become one of the most powerful people in a government that is not bound by law. 59 The SK essentially bypasses the General Prosecutor's office and is utterly independent of it with regard to its director's appointment, that of his subordinates, and its finances. All of those will be subordinated directly to the president, removing the whole sphere of investigation and prosecution of political and business figures from the purview of the regular government (although allegedly, the Prosecutor General will review the SK's proceedings for their legality) and placing it under the control of the president and his administration, Russia's real government. This exemplifies the process by which the truly effective but shadowy and unregulated institutions of government (so designated because there is little or no provision for them in the law or the constitution) rather than the ornamental and formally designated organs of government, namely the president's administration, has usurped power in Putin's Russia. 60 Thus the SK will escape any accountability, even of a purely formal kind, to the Duma. And given Bastrykin's personal loyalty to Putin, it seems clear that Putin is manipulating the "power vertical" to ensure that he and his appointments hold on to power into the Medvedev period by upholding the Undoubtedly, the SK will become a major actor, or at least a potential major actor, in Russian politics and this succession. Some analysts argue that Putin intends to control all investigations personally through his choice of Bastrykin. 62 But if this was not enough, the SK has the potential to emerge, much as did Andrei Vyshinsky's office of the Procurator-General in the great purges, as a major instrument for the redistribution of political and economic power. It already can become a permanent sword of Damocles over the entire political system and its members. Under the circumstances, this and every succession, as well as the run-up to them, are characterized by an intense no holds barred competition for power and property. We may envision the SK as an institution that simultaneously abets and restrains this kind of politics, by creating a pervasive possibility of investigation and conviction among all elites.
Coming to power, Russia's current leaders sought to convert power into property to acquire those assets and utilized state agencies under their control to deprive owners of energy firms or of mineral deposits of their ownership and control. All these groups, having divided up the spoils, currently enjoy Putin's protection. But as he is leaving, everything they own is now at risk from whomever might win the succession sweepstakes. As a recent analysis observes:
It is now fundamentally important for the Kremlin groupings to preserve their political assets, and they can only be augmented at the expense of rivals in the shadow "vertical axis of power." One of the most viable methods for legitimating less than perfectly clean assets and illicit power is the legalization of the political status of the players -their presence in the Duma, the Federation Council, the government, and the future President's staff. Correspondingly, virtually the most effective way of fighting your rivals is to prevent them getting into legal politics. Given the intensification of the struggle among pro-regime groupings at a time when supreme power in the country is changing hands, it is perfectly logical from the viewpoint of the interests of the current business elites to give the Prosecutor's office a political oversight role. On the one hand, this will make it possible to prevent, for example, a joint opposition candidate from participating in the presidential election, if such a candidate should eventually emerge. On the other, it will provide an opportunity to prevent rivals from other groupings from strengthening their position at the expense of the regions.
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The SK can thus be used to purge enemies from their positions to clear space for members of a victorious grouping, just as occurred in 1937, if not Ivan the Terrible's Oprichnina. As one commentary observed, Of course, the economic articles of the Criminal Code are not going to disappear from the political struggle. And the process of redistributing assets or raw material resources among the "victors" will continue nevertheless. But the political articles both provide an opportunity to combat the non-establishment opposition (those who are not part of the Kremlin political pool) and also allow some sections of the system to fight others. Economic raids on behalf of the state with the assistance of, again, the Prosecutor's Office have become one of the key elements of the Putin era. It appears that we are now entering an era of political raiding when the owners of dubious assets and people with a weak position in the regime will be emerging from the shadows using legal political institutions and not allowing their rivals to do the same. So the Investigations Committee will still play a role in Russia's political history irrespective of which specific Kremlin groupings are behind its creation and what thrust they impart to this body's work. Accordingly, summarizing a great deal of evidence, Janusz Bugajski observes that such criminal penetration of Central and Eastern Europe, including the members of the CIS, is a major security concern to those governments because these criminal networks both destabilize their host countries and render services to political interests in Moscow.
The Russian Mafiya greatly expanded its activities throughout the region during the 1990s and established regional networks in such illicit endeavors as drug smuggling, money laundering, international prostitution, and migrant trafficking. In some countries, Russian syndicates have been in competition with local gangs, while in others they have collaborated and complemented each other. Analysts in the region contended that Russian intelligence services coordinated several criminal groups abroad and directed a proportion of their resources to exert economic and political influence in parts of Eastern Europe. 69 Russia's April, 2003 gas deal with Turkmenistan, a pivotal move in Putin's grand design to secure for Russia a leading place in what would be an analogue of OPEC's cartel for natural gas, exemplifies the process as it pertains as well to Central Asia. The firm chosen to move gas from Turkmenistan to Russia and Ukraine is Eural Trans Gas, a firm chartered in a Hungarian village named Csadba and headed, through an intricate maze of shell companies, by one of Russia's most notorious organized crime lords, Semyon Mogilevich.
70 Eural Trans Gas stood to make from $320 million to First, it displays the commingling of government, major energy corporations, and criminal enterprises in Russia and their mutual enrichment at the expense of the citizens of the CIS, not just Russia. As these firms were already contributing significant sums to President Putin's reelection, he and his colleagues cannot pretend ignorance of Eural Trans Gas' background.
Thus we see graphic evidence of the criminalization of Russian energy policy -the most vital sector of the economy and one controlled by the state, the state, and the special services. 71 The similar events in Ukraine and the attempts to use a subsequent company Rosukrenerego, as the main player in transferring Russian gas to Ukraine when it was controlled by suspicoius elements, is also well known. 72 
Conclusions
Obviously, several intersecting processes are occurring. Regime elites simultaneously are jockeying for position and power, including rents that they will be able to retain at the expense of their rivals in the upcoming succession. Some of them are trying to restructure the system so that Putin can function as the grey eminence even if someone else is formally in charge, and Putin is trying to ensure that his legacy and policies, if not his power, are maintained after he leaves office. As a result, Putin, who remains the last authoritative actor in the system, refuses to truly commit to any successor and seeks to exploit these rivalries to maintain his discretion e.g. by appointing his man, Bastrykin, to head the SK and to divide up the armed forces so they can oppose but not mount a challenge to him. Similarly his efforts to ensure control over state spending and the budget reflect his ambition to place a whole series of "continuity mechanisms" or checks and balances over the entire political system at the same time as he is fashioning a future domestic policy that will undoubtedly increase state controls in the economy and over state spending.
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But in doing so, he has strengthened the tendencies toward despotism and a police state, most notably through institutions like the SK. The ongoing nationalization of key economic sectors, the intensification of the struggle for the CIS and against the West, and the growing resort to police intimidation and violence against critics like Politkovskaya and Litvinenko also find their analogue in this future domestic policy. In other words, authoritarian rule, nationalist mobilization against domestic and foreign enemies, and a police state cannot easily be confined to one sphere. Instead these forces have engulfed the entire system and will continue to do so, until they break down or meet superior force. It is unlikely that the authoritarian regime consolidated by Putin can stay where it is or retreat to democracy unaided or unless it is compelled to do so by external forces stronger than it. But, as we have suggested, it is all too possible for it to become steadily more authoritarian and corrupt while remaining within the Muscovite paradigm (with Soviet admixtures) alluded to above.
Succession struggles remain the Achilles heel of the system because they force an ever-clearer exposure of its fault lines and inherent fragilities for all of Putin's undoubted successes. Close examination of these fault lines reveals the growing pathology of the regime's politics even as it advances economically and fiscally. But unfortunately, for those who think that in Russia the economy will triumph over the state, we should remember that this economy is largely a creation of that same pathological state and is excessively tied to rents from energy. The scale of corruption, violence, and misrule has its own logic as well as its own timetable, which we cannot know in advance. But especially as this system reproduces the paradigm of past Russian experiments in state building, we can predict the destination with reasonable accuracy, especially as Russia has tragically been there before.
